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Abstract: In the state of Israel wastewater management (WWM), the legal responsibility 
of municipalities, was neglected for decades, resulting in pollution of the scarce water 
resources and the environment. This trend was reversed during the 1990s. This paper 
analyses the evolution process of the national WWM regime and its effect on WWM at the 
municipal level, and explains the paradigm shift. It is found that both the long-term neglect 
and the paradigm shift can be attributed to the central government’s policies regarding 
WWM rather than to the local authorities.  
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1. Introduction  
Israel is burdened by a serious scarcity of fresh water, with currently ca. 180 cubic meters (CM) per 
capita per annum [1], and has been facing for some years a real water crisis. One would expect that the 
scarce water resources would be well managed and protected, but focusing on development, water has 
been mainly managed for quantity (resource-use) rather than for quality (resource-protection).  
Over-pumping and on-going pollution have resulted in severe deterioration of the water resources. 
Untreated or partially treated wastewater became the main source of pollution of surface and 
groundwater, as well as the environment [2]. 
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In the state of Israel wastewater management (WWM) i.e., collection, treatment and disposal, is the 
legal responsibility of municipal authorities [3], as is the case in many countries. While municipalities 
constructed sewerage systems to remove hazards from population centers from an early stage, the 
treatment and disposal components were widely neglected for decades [4]. This trend, however, was 
reversed during the 1990s when most municipalities began engaging in building advanced wastewater 
treatment plants (WWTP) [3]. 
Since the municipalities are legally responsible, the long-term neglect has traditionally been 
attributed to them, but a study concerning the processes for establishing WWTPs in municipalities in 
Israel, however, reveals that the central government’s policies and agendas regarding WWM highly 
influenced WWM at the municipal level and can explain both the long-term neglect as well as the 
paradigm shift of the 1990s. The paper discusses the WWM regime from the central government’s 
level to answer two research questions: (i) what was the evolution process of the national WWM 
regime in Israel and how did it affect WWM at the municipal level? and (ii), how can the paradigm 
shift be explained? The analysis refers to municipal WWM within Israel only; other important issues 
such as cross-boundary pollution are beyond the scope of this paper.  
The theoretical approach for the analysis of the evolution process and the paradigm shift, in the 
paper, is inspired by both the Institutional Resources Regimes (IRR) and the transition theories. These 
are elaborated in Section 2. Sections 3 and 4 describe the evolution and the transition processes 
respectively, conclusions are drawn in Section 5.  
2. Theoretical Background and Approach 
2.1. Institutional Resource Regime and Resource Regime Evolution  
The Israeli WWM regime evolution is analyzed within the conceptual framework of the IRR theory. 
While previous works mainly address water resources management [5-8] it is relevant to this case as 
WWM is considered in this paper as part of the overall water management and as a resource by itself.  
IRR is a new approach that analyses the sustainability of resource regimes and their development 
over time. According to IRR, regimes evolve as a response to the change in the quantity/availability of 
the resource, and four types of regimes are identified: no-regime, simple-regime, complex-regime and 
integrated-regime [6]. Since they evolve from one another, they can also be referred to as ‘phases’ in 
the evolution process.  
A central assumption of the theory is that resource regimes are identified as institutional systems 
that combine two components: (i) ‘property rights’ of the resource (ownership/uses); and (ii) the 
‘public policy’ designed for the use and protection of the resource. Both components should be 
complimentary and must be considered, if institutional sustainability of the resource management, is to 
be achieved [5,9].  
Property rights refer to ownership and uses/users of the resource. Concerning ownership, traditional 
types include state-, private-, common- and no- property [5]. Concerning uses/use functions of water 
resources, several can be identified, see for example, [6]. Public policy, in this paper, refers to the five 
elements of public governance as defined by Bressers and Kuks [10]: levels and scales of governance; 
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actors in the policy network; problem perception and policy objectives; strategy and instruments; and 
responsibilities and resources for implementation.  
The regime types/phases and the shift between them are defined based on criteria of ‘extent’ and 
‘coherence’ of property rights and public policy. ‘Extent’ refers to the scope of the uses/users that are 
acknowledged by the regime (“how many uses are regulated and protected by the regime?”) and to the 
scope of the public policy elements (“how many actors, instruments, resources are involved in the 
resource management?”). ‘Coherence’ refers to the degree of coordination within and between 
property rights and public policy components of the regime (“are the different uses and policy 
elements well coordinated?”; “Is there a match between all uses as target groups of the policy 
system?)” [5,8,9]. Based on that, simple regimes are characterized by low extent as they tend to 
recognize/regulate only one/few uses and usually are single-elements regimes: e.g., one governing 
actor, one problem perception, etc. The coherence can be thus characterized as medium-high. Complex 
regimes are characterized by increasing extent—as more uses are regulated, as well as policy system 
with multiple elements, for example, when more actors, instruments, resources, are involved. Increase 
of complexity, however, does not necessarily mean increase of coherence and complex but fragmented 
regimes are common. Therefore, complex regimes are characterized by higher extent but low 
coherence. The shift towards integrated regimes implies that both the extent and coherence are 
characterized as high (more elements, well coordinated) but requires a deliberate effort and will occur 
only when the relevant actors acknowledge that such integration is necessary to prevent further 
deterioration of the resource. Integrated regimes are considered most sustainable ones [5,6,9].  
To conclude, resource regimes shift over time as a response to growing scarcity of the resource, and 
evolve from simple regimes (regulating single/few uses with single public policy elements, well 
coordinated) to complex but fragmented regimes (regulating more uses with multiple public policy 
elements, yet fragmented and not well coordinated) to—eventually with deliberate effort—integrated 
regimes (regulating all uses with multiple public policy elements, well coordinated).  
Regime types/phases in water management can also be described as use-driven policies (facilitating 
the economic uses of water resources) or protection-driven policies (facilitating the ecological 
uses/functions of water resources). In this paper, use-driven policies are defined as policies that 
facilitate wastewater as a water resource whereas protection-driven policies are broadened to include 
protection of all relevant resources: public health and ecological uses of water.  
2.2. Transitions  
The shift between regime phases is marked by a transition. Transitions are stimulated by triggers. 
Kissling-Näf and Kuks [5] identify problem-related triggers and institutional triggers. Problem-related 
triggers can be sudden external shocks or a problem that increases slowly until it becomes too serious 
to ignore. Institutional triggers include, for example, a change in relationships between actors; the 
introduction of a higher administrative/political system (e.g., the EU); etc. Mentioned by  
Bressers et al. [9] and relevant to this discussion, are also demographic developments and the general 
policy process in related fields. The triggers are expected to affect motives and resources of  
actors involved.  
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A transition process, however, can also fail. In this case changes in one element would not be 
followed by changes in other elements of the regime, leading to failed or partial regime shift [6]. This 
implies that triggers, important as they may be, require favorable conditions for successful transitions. 
Bressers et al. [9] address preconditions as tradition of cooperation, joint problems, joint opportunities, 
credible alternative threat, and institutional interfaces, whereas Kampa and Bressers [8] after Kuks [7] 
refer to the institutional context in terms of power distribution, values, and perceptions of water issues 
in a nation. In this paper, the transitions observed in the Israeli WWM evolution and the 
presence/absence of favorable conditions explaining them, are analyzed within the conceptual 
framework of transition theory. 
The transition theory refers to change processes in societal systems. It describes transitions as a  
long-term process resulting from co-evolution of cultural, institutional, economical, ecological and 
technological developments. A precondition is that several developments in these different domains 
interact and positively reinforce each other. The triggers for transitions can include slow social changes 
or short-term events. The theory identifies key concepts/tools: multi-stage; multi-level; and  
multi-change. The multi-change concept addresses transition management. The multi-stage and  
multi-level concepts are used to explain transitions [11] and are thus relevant to this discussion.  
According to the multi-stage concept, a transition can be described in four stages: (i) a  
pre-development stage where changes occur under the surface; (ii) a take-off stage in which the state of 
the system begins to shift; (iii) an acceleration stage where visible structural changes take place rapidly 
through an accumulation of socio-cultural, economic, ecological and institutional changes that 
reinforce each other; and (iv) a stabilization stage where a new dynamic equilibrium is reached.  
The multi-level concept distinguishes between three levels at which transition processes take place: 
macro-, meso-, and micro-level. At the macro-level influences are related to changes in the macro 
economy, politics, population dynamics, natural environment, etc. At the meso-level the regime 
operates and the dynamics are determined by dominant practices, norms, the organizations and policies 
that are often geared towards preserving the status quo. At the micro-level individual actors and 
practices deviate from the status quo by new ideas, initiatives, etc.  
These concepts are combined to explain transitions. The take-off stage is reached when 
developments occur on the macro and micro levels and reinforce each other. It requires that different 
perspectives from different fields cross-fertilize and converge into more-or-less one paradigm, causing 
the regime to changes. In the acceleration stage, the regime has an enabling role through the 
application of capital, technology and knowledge (=resources). Dominant practices then change 
rapidly and irreversibly reach the stabilization stage, which represents another equilibrium [11,12]. 
While the theory refers to long-term processes and to introduction of innovations, it nevertheless 
inspires the analysis of the transition phases described in this paper.  
2.3. Property Rights and Public Policy elements, WWM—the Israeli Case 
For the purpose of the analysis, some elements should be specified to the Israeli case. Concerning 
property rights, water resources—including wastewater effluent, are public property based on the 1959 
Water Law, although an article in the 1962 Local Authorities (Sewerage) Law allows municipalities to 
sell effluent. Regarding uses, the following are hereby defined:  
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 WWM for the protection of health: since in Israel wastewater reuse for irrigation is a common 
practice, the traditional health aspect of protecting water supply systems and bathing waters is 
broadened to include prevention of health risks from irrigation with effluent;  
 Wastewater for agricultural use: wastewater is managed as a water resource to increase  
water potential; 
 WWM for the protection of fresh water resources: in Israel wastewater was traditionally 
discharged to the adjacent stream/river-bed if not used for agriculture, resulting in surface and 
groundwater pollution [1] and [13].  
 WWM for the protection of the environment (ecological uses): (i) protection of maritime 
environment; (ii) rehabilitation of streams: in semi-arid Israel, all water resources are  
exploited [3]. Streams were utilized as well as used as sewage conduits for decades resulting in 
ongoing grave conditions of streams [13]. Recognizing effluent allocation for streams while 
restricting its quality can reverse this trend [1].  
 
Concerning public policy, the five elements of public governance include:  
 
 Levels and scales of governance; Israel has a single-tier system of local government with no 
regional/provincial governments [14] and is not a member of a higher form of governance (e.g., 
the European Union). Regional councils—federations of rural settlements—are considered a 
form of local government. Drainage boards, which are based on topographic features, are 
responsible for soil erosion and flooding but are not authorized to control sewage [13]. 
Therefore, the relevant levels are the local and central governments. However, with respect to 
WWM some other relevant bodies—although not a formal level of government—should be 
mentioned. Firstly, Associations of Towns for the establishment of WWTP. This  
inter-municipal cooperation is common since the 1990s. Such associations are established for 
the purpose of providing a specific service and have access to funds as a separate legal  
entity [15]. Secondly, regional/district planning authorities have the statutory power to approve 
construction of WWTPs. These are comprised of representatives of different Ministries, local 
governments and public sectors, and as such affect the issue from the local and central levels’ 
perspective (e.g., within the framework of the existing legislation). Thirdly, River Authorities. 
The first River Authority was established in 1989, and others followed since then. Some of the 
River Authorities are also involved in related issues, such as destination of the effluent for 
reuse. These, however, are not considered in this paper as levels of government, but are rather 
addressed as ‘actors’ when applicable.  
 Actors in the policy network; governmental (e.g., municipalities and different Ministries) and  
non-governmental actors, as elaborated in section 3.  
 Problem perception and policy objectives; generally, WWM aims at: (i) protection of public 
health; (ii) protection of the environment and the water resources; and (iii) as a water resource 
(by effluent reuse) [16,17]. While the first two represent the historical development of WWM, 
the latter is relevant especially in arid/semi-arid regions. All are relevant in the Israeli case.  
 Strategy and instruments; relevant legislation and its enforcement; command-and-control vs. 
market instruments, as elaborated in section 3.  
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 Responsibilities and resources for implementation; the different actors and responsibilities 
concerning policy implementation and the resources (financial and personnel) available to 
them. 
 
2.4. Methodology  
 
The findings presented in the paper form a part of a larger study. The methodology used to collect 
data includes documents review, e.g., correspondences between position holders within relevant 
Ministries and other actors, minutes of meetings, relevant legislation, etc., using the State Archive, as 
well as interviews with relevant stakeholders, e.g., Government officials, environmental  
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), experts from the academy, and private consultants, since 
the establishment of the State. This is found suitable for the qualitative approach used in the research. 
At points, the author relies on dated literature sources. This is due to the historical perspective and is 
used for the purpose of the analysis. 
3. WWM Regime Evolution  
3.1. Phase One—Wastewater as a Water Resource, 1948–1970 
Upon achieving independence in 1948 and freed from the British Mandate Government’s 
moratorium on immigration, the new state of Israel underwent rapid development and the population 
grew by 50% within a year and a half after independence. Israel had to cope with a major task of rapid 
development, which was a critical necessity in absorbing the massive waves of immigrants in a short 
period of time, providing housings and employment, and developing a strong economy. All 
development funds were being directed to solving these urgent issues. Water was essential for 
achieving this rapid development [2] and the State developed impressive national water projects such 
as the National Water Carrier and major regional systems during 1950s–1960s. This was aimed 
especially to support the very important agriculture sector, as elaborated in the following, and water 
has been managed for quantity rather than for quality [18]. These use-driven policies influenced 
WWM as wastewater was mainly perceived as a water resource, and sanitation and environmental 
issues were considered relatively low on the national agenda [19]. While municipalities constructed 
sewers to remove hazards from the population centers, treatment facilities and sanitary disposal, lagged 
behind [20].  
Property Rights  
Ownership: wastewater is owned by the public, as part of the national water resources under the 
1959 Water Law (Art. 1 and 2). When the Law was promulgated it enabled municipalities to collect 
wastewater charges to cover the costs of constructing sewers, but not for constructing WWTPs. 
However, the 1962 Local Authorities (Sewerage) Law (Art. 15) allows municipalities to sell effluent to 
recover WWTP costs.  
Uses: ‘WWM for health aspect’ (via the Sewerage Law) and ‘protection of fresh water resources’ 
(via the Water Law) were addressed by legislation but not enforced [2] and [21]; ‘wastewater for 
Water 2010, 2              
 
 
445
agricultural use’ is the only use recognized by the dominant actors in the policy system in practice. 
Other uses (e.g., ‘WWM for the protection of the environment’) are not yet acknowledged by neither 
legislation nor policy-makers.  
Public Policy  
Problem perception and policy objectives: The main policy objective with respect to WWM was 
managing wastewater as a water resource. In the new State, agriculture was an important economic 
sector but furthermore, it represented Zionistic ideologies of settling the land, the right to work own 
land in own country, etc., and as such became a major national target [2]. Focusing on strong 
agriculture, water policy and management were very much dictated by the agricultural lobby and 
irrigation interests outweighed other uses such as protection of natural water resources [18]. The Water 
Commissioner—the highest authority in Israel concerning water management, was subordinated to the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGR) and appointed by the Minister, thus heavily influenced by the 
agricultural sector, the largest water consumer and a very powerful sector, at the time. The MINAGR’s 
prime interest was not to preserve the water resources but rather to promote the agricultural sector. 
Accordingly, wastewater was seen in this period primarily as an additional (cheap/free-of-cost) water 
resource to be utilized by farmers. Other aspects of WWM were mainly neglected. The public health 
aspect was addressed by the construction of sewers by municipalities to the satisfaction of central 
authorities, ignoring the treatment component, whereas WWM for environmental protection (including 
water resources) was non-existent. The policy objective in this phase was, therefore, of single-element;  
Actors in the policy network: In this phase actors were only governmental. Apart from the 
municipalities, actors included the MINAGR (especially via the Water Commissioner), Ministry of 
Health (MINHLT), Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Employment (Housing Department) and the 
Treasury Ministry. The two actors directly involved were the MINAGR and the MINHLT, but 
although the only statutory authority to approve sewage works was in the hands of the MINHLT, in 
practice, this Ministry was smaller and weaker in comparison to the MINAGR [22,23], which became 
the dominant actor, and the two exhibit rivalries. The other Ministries were passive with respect to 
WWM and followed the lead of MINAGR. In an attempt for cooperation, the Sewage Committee—an 
inter-ministerial committee, was established in 1953 by the MINAGR. However, out of eleven Central 
Government members, six represented the MINAGR (including the Chair) and only two the MINHLT, 
and the Committee was to report to the Minister of Agriculture, reflecting the power imbalance. 
Furthermore, the Committee was mostly inactive thus ineffective. To conclude, small number and type 
of actors are involved with no real distribution of power or cooperation.  
Levels and scales of governance: While both levels shared legal responsibilities, in practice there 
was a distinction between the sanitation (removal of hazards from population centers) and the 
treatment components. The former was seen as a municipal domain with little involvement of the 
central authorities, whereas concerning the latter, since effluent was seen as a national water resource, 
the decision-making power was very centralized with little consideration to municipalities’ needs if 
they were not aligned with the central agenda. Municipal plans that did not include an element of 
effluent reuse were rejected, even in case of environmental pollution (for example, the costal town of 
Nahariya). The level of governance involved is, therefore, of single-element 
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Strategy and instruments: concerning legislation, relevant Laws are the Water Law and the 
Sewerage Law. The Water Law regulates the management of Israel’s water resources, their 
preservation and their allocation for use, and designates the Water Commissioner vast authority to 
protect water resources [18], thus, regulates the uses of ‘WWM for the protection of fresh water 
resources’ and ‘wastewater for agricultural use’. This Law provides the framework to protect water 
resources from wastewater pollution but was not enforced as the Water Commissioners in this period 
are biased towards the agricultural sector, as above-mentioned. The Sewerage Law was promulgated as 
a bottom-up pressure from municipalities, mainly allowing them to introduce wastewater charges 
although only for sewers and not for WWTP (illustrating the low priority given to the treatment 
component by central authorities). As such, it acknowledged the use of ‘WWM for health aspects’. 
The Law, however, has several flaws. Firstly, it states that sewers (and later WWTPs) should be built 
to the satisfaction of the MINHLT, with no further specification (Art. 10 and 11); and secondly it does 
not specify any sanctions in case that its requirements are not fulfilled. The legislation, therefore, 
acknowledged only two uses, and furthermore—was not enforced. In terms of instruments, only 
command-and-control tools are used (although enforcement is lacking), resulting in  
single-element instruments.  
Responsibilities and resources for implementation: concerning responsibilities, the division among 
the actors was unclear. Actors with formal responsibilities for WWM (e.g., the municipalities and the 
MINHLT) were over-powered by a less formal but dominant actor—the MINAGR. This affected also 
the availability of resources for implementation. Since WWM is the municipalities’ responsibility, the 
resources should have been available to them, but this was not the case. Financial resources for WWTP 
were not available as separate national budgets were not allocated for this purpose. Since 
municipalities were not encouraged to raise private capital, they were dependent on indirect budgets 
(e.g., from the MINAGR). Municipalities mostly lacked the personnel resources needed for efficient 
WWM and only the large ones had access to such resources. Others relied heavily on the central level, 
impeding their ability to implement. The MINHLT was a weak and small Ministry with few financial 
resources, lacking its own budgets for sanitation. Other ministries such as the Ministry of Interior or 
Employment had their own financial resources but WWM was not their first priority and lacked the 
relevant personnel resources, relying heavily on the MINAGR. Therefore, although the responsibilities 
are seemingly shared, division is unclear and in practice the dominancy of the MINAGR is reinforced 
when it comes to resources for implementation.  
Regime Analysis  
The ‘extent’ is low. Concerning property rights system, while two uses are regulated (health aspects 
and prevention of water pollution), in practice only wastewater for irrigation is addressed by policy 
makers. Internal coherence is low as the different rights of these uses are not coordinated, but rather 
the dominant one overshadows the others. The public policy system is mainly a single-element system, 
thus low extent. Its internal coherence is low as despite the formal attempt there is no/very little 
coordination among and between the policy elements (actors, goals, etc). The external coherence is 
low-medium because not all users are recognized as target groups of the policy system. The first phase 
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is therefore defined as simple: low extent of both uses and policy elements and low-medium 
coherence.  
The Regime’s Results (Effect on Municipal WWM) 
WWM in this period was characterized by a single problem perspective backed by a strong 
agricultural lobby, a centralized decision-making style, insufficient instruments and lack of 
enforcement. The focus was on use-driven policies. Municipalities were not pressured to treat 
wastewater and the few that initiated plans, were mostly rejected if the plans suggested advanced 
technical solutions or did not include reuse elements.  
The approach led by the MINAGR was that effluent irrigation was of high priority and provided 
adequate low-cost solution for wastewater treatment. It therefore advocated the establishment of 
facilities for primary treatment, often only reservoirs, followed by irrigation with low-quality effluent. 
These facilities are considerably cheaper than advanced facilities and were thus considered suitable 
also from a financial point-of-view, and accepted by other actors (e.g., Ministries of Interior, Treasury, 
and Employment which had to allocate its own budgets in newly built housing complexes). However, 
farmers themselves were not always in favor of effluent irrigation as in this period water scarcity was 
not yet a pressing issue. Indeed, effluent irrigation was not common and only 4.5% of generated 
effluent was utilized in 1956. Furthermore, the low-quality effluent was used by the farmers only when 
needed, and in non-irrigation season surplus effluents was discharged into the nearest stream. The 
facilities themselves soon became a hazard source, as they were not properly maintained and upgraded. 
This state of affairs resulted in continuous discharge of untreated or partially treated wastewater to the 
environment and the pollution of water resources.  
3.2. Phase Two—Simple to Complex: Failed Regime Shift; 1970–End of 1980s  
In August 1970 a cholera outbreak occurred. Almost 300 cases were reported, including 20 
casualties. The outbreak was traced to consumption of raw vegetables that were irrigated with  
low-quality effluent. The outbreak caused a public outcry and had economic consequences on the 
tourism and agricultural sectors, putting heavy pressures on the Government. The relevant Ministries 
held urgent meetings and the health aspect of WWM received high priority. The Government made 
two decisions: a new inter-ministerial committee for WWM was established, and most importantly—
an urgent loan was asked from the World Bank for the construction of wastewater infrastructure. The 
agreement with the World Bank was signed in 1972.  
However, the outbreak had a short-term effect as soon after things went back to ‘business-as-usual’ 
with little change from the previous phase. The committee was comprised of the Director Generals of 
the relevant Ministries. The Director General of the Ministry of Interior was appointed as a Chair, but 
this was only a formal appointment. In practice, the Water Commissioner ran the committee [24]. The 
MINAGR was also the only Ministry with two representatives, maintaining dominancy over the issue. 
The committee’s task was to agree on related policy. To execute its decisions, an operative arm—the 
‘National Sewage Project’ was established, headed by the Water Commissioner with the task of 
reviewing municipal plans, allocating budgets if approved, and supervising the implementation. The 
committee, however, convened rarely and did not execute its task. In the absence of guiding policy, it 
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was the operative arm that dictated the approach to WWM, via budgets [4]. Wastewater continued to 
be managed primarily as a water resource, affecting the approved technical solutions. The health 
aspect was yet again considered as secondary, environmental and water resources  
protection, non-existent.  
The agreement with the World Bank had a potentially important role in improving WWM. Apart 
from providing budgets, it also required adjustments in relevant legislation and management practices 
on both financial (e.g., wastewater charges for WWTPs) and technical (e.g., facilities’ maintenance, 
industrial wastewater pre-treatment) issues. Most of these, however, while formally introduced, were 
not enforced. The agreement with the World Bank ended in 1982, and WWM continued unchanged. 
The momentum was missed.  
Property Rights  
Ownership: unchanged from the previous phase. 
Uses: ‘WWM for health aspect’ and ‘protection of fresh water resources’ remained unchanged. The 
use of ‘wastewater for agriculture use’ was formally restricted via the 1981 Public Health Ordinance 
(wastewater treatment for irrigation), promulgated by the MINHLT.  
Public Policy  
Problem perception and policy objectives: In the immediate period following the cholera outbreak, 
the policy objective was broadened and preventing health hazards received higher priority alongside 
wastewater as a water resource. Soon after, however, the latter remained the main objective as WWM 
continued to be dominated by the agricultural sector [22] and [25]. Several factors explain the 
prioritization of effluent utilization in this phase. Firstly, in drought years water allocation for 
agricultural use is cut down to accommodate the non-flexible water demand of the domestic and 
industrial sectors. Population and economic growth in this period resulted in increased water demands 
while the available fresh water resources remained unchanged, increasing the importance of 
wastewater reuse. Secondly, during the 1970s cotton became a very profitable crop. Since cotton can 
be irrigated with very low quality effluent (from a health perspective) it provided a growing market for 
such effluent and contributed to the continuous neglect of adequate wastewater treatment. WWM for 
environmental protection (including water resources) was still non-existent. The policy objective in 
this phase, therefore, remained single-element;  
Actors: mainly remained unchanged. Concerning power distribution, while the MINHLT received 
an opportunity to play a more substantial role—it was missed and the Ministry remained a marginal 
actor. The Ministry of Interior became more involved due to its obligation towards the World Bank 
with respect to municipalities that received loans, but WWM was not its prime interest and it continued 
to follow the lead of the MINAGR. The Treasury Ministry should have provided 60% of the projects’ 
cost according to the agreement with the World Bank and had a clear interest to reduce costs, 
following the lead of the MINAGR as well. Thus, MINAGR remained the dominant actor, via the 
Water Commissioner and the National Sewage Project [4]. A new actor—the Environmental 
Protection Service (EPS), was established in 1973 as a department in the Prime Minister’s office. 
Following the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 the Israeli Government created a research arm in the 
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Prime Minister’s office, which later became the core of the newly created EPS, influencing the 
perception of the environment and sewerage systems. The EPS was transferred in 1976 to the Ministry 
of Interior, mainly in order to affect local authorities’ handling of sewage. The EPS had representatives 
in scientific forums of the National Sewage Project but no decision-making power [26]. Nevertheless, 
it should be mentioned as an important actor, as in fact it prepared the ground for the Ministry of the 
Environmental Protection that would be established at a much later stage, providing the Ministry with 
the professional expertise needed for the new tasks. It would also be involved in important 
environmental developments such as the establishment of River Authorities.  
An attempt for cooperation can be identified again in the form of the inter-ministerial committee, 
but yet again MINAGR remained dominant and this committee was as inactive and ineffective as its 
former. To conclude, small number and type of actors were involved and there was no real distribution 
of power or cooperation.  
Levels of Governance: Remains Unchanged. 
Strategy and instruments: concerning legislation, the Water Law remained unchanged and not 
enforced despite growing pollution from untreated wastewater and increasing water scarcity. The 
Water Commissioner could have brought criminal charges against polluters under the Water Law, but 
did not do so [2]. Reactions to concrete warnings from the National Water Supply Company regarding 
pollution of wells were delayed for years. This reflects the failure to restrict one use (‘wastewater for 
agricultural use’) in order to protect other uses’ rights. The Sewerage Law was amended per the 
requirement of the World Bank allowing municipalities to introduce wastewater charges to recover 
WWTP costs—previously prohibited, thus further regulating the ‘WWM for health aspects’ use. Apart 
from this, the Law remained unchanged. New legislation was introduced in the form of the  
above-mentioned 1981 regulations for effluent reuse, restricting the ‘wastewater for agricultural use’ in 
order to protect public health (not water resources). The regulations, however, were too general (no 
specification of effluent quality required) and were thus difficult to enforce. Additional new legislation 
was the 1981 model Local Authorities By-Law (Discharge of Industrial Sewage into the Sewage 
System), promulgated by the Ministry of Interior per the requirement of the World Bank, in order to 
protect the treatment facilities as well as public health and the environment. This, however, was 
introduced as a voluntary by-law and by 1998 only 53 out of 265 local authorities have adopted it, 
while its enforcement is questionable. The legislation regulated more uses (although not all), thus its 
extent increases. Nevertheless, it mostly remained too vague, and not enforced. Instruments remained 
unchanged therefore single-element. 
Responsibilities and resources for implementation: concerning responsibilities, the situation 
remained mainly unchanged and the MINAGR overpowered other actors with formal responsibilities. 
All actors, including ones with new responsibilities based on the agreement with the World Bank—
consciously allowed the MINAGR to take the lead, as WWM is not a primal interest of any of them. 
Concerning resources, separate budgets aimed directly at wastewater infrastructure were available for 
the first time due to the agreement with the World Bank. These, however, were assigned to the Central 
Government (the National Sewage Project, chaired by the Water Commissioner). Municipalities 
remained dependent on the central authorities to access funds. The MINHLT remained weaker and 
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smaller in comparison to the MINAGR with no control over the new financial resources. Other 
Ministries continued to follow the lead of the MINAGR. Thus, although the responsibilities are 
seemingly shared, in practice the dominancy of the MINAGR was reinforced when it came to 
resources for implementation.  
Regime Analysis  
The ‘extent’ is slightly increased. Concerning PR system, alongside the health aspects and 
prevention of water pollution there is an attempt to regulate/restrict effluent irrigation. Other uses, 
however, are still not recognized, therefore the extent can be characterized as low-medium. The 
internal coherence is low-medium as in the immediate period following the cholera outbreak there is 
an attempt to coordinate the different uses but soon-after the dominancy of one use, prevailed. 
Concerning the PP system, the extent slightly increased with the appearance of new instruments (new 
legislation) and resources (separate budgets). However, other elements remained unchanged therefore 
mainly a single-element system. The internal coherence is characterized as medium as despite the 
initial formal attempt, coordination among and between policy elements remained unchanged. The 
external coherence is low-medium because the mismatch between the systems remained unchanged. 
Not all use rights are recognized by the policy system which continues to be dominated by one main 
objective, neglecting other uses/objectives despite growing concerns.  
The second phase is therefore defined as simple to complex: failed regime shift. While following 
the cholera event there is an increase in extent and complexity with an attempt to shift to  
protection-driven policies, this increase is short-termed and very soon WWM is back to be dominated 
by similar actors and objectives, as in the pre-cholera phase. The use-driven policies prevailed.  
The Regime’s Results 
Despite the opportunity presented by the cholera outbreak, the dominant policy makers continued 
managing wastewater in a short-term sectoral orientation, neglecting the sanitary and environmental 
uses, including protecting water resources. WWM, as part of the water resources management, 
remained in the hands of the MINAGR and the Water Commission. Prioritizing water use for irrigation 
and lack of enforcement of water-protection laws by the Water Commissioners [18] resulted in an 
approach for WWM that included low-cost, low-tech solutions e.g., stabilization ponds, followed by 
effluent irrigation, an approach that was known as ‘agro-sanitation’. This was perceived as the most 
suitable approach, supplying cheap additional water source while providing an adequate solution for 
urban wastewater. From municipal point of view, the centralized style of policy-making reduced, de 
facto, the responsibility of municipalities as well as the resources available to them for 
implementation, causing them to rely heavily on central authorities. Municipal WWM plans that did 
not fit the  
‘agro-sanitation’ approach, were rejected, with the exception of the big Metropolitan area of  
Tel-Aviv [25]. Furthermore, the lack of regulated base-line standards for effluent quality meant that 
any treatment was legally sufficient. This state of affairs suited the local governments as many used 
income from water and wastewater charges for other purposes especially when in fiscal stress [18]. All 
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these dictated the WWM solutions of this period, releasing municipalities of their responsibility and 
allowing them to continue neglecting WWM. 
3.3. Phase Three—Paradigm Shift; End of 1980s/Beginning of 1990s <  
In the end of 1980s and beginning of 1990s several factors aligned to influence policy makers to 
adapt a different approach. Firstly, the prevailing norm of discharging wastewater to the environment 
combined with population growth, resulted in growing pollution of water resources, too serious to 
ignore. Furthermore, in the mid-1980s the global cotton prices dropped and farmers shifted to more 
profitable crops, drastically reducing the demand for low-quality effluent. Secondly, the water crisis 
became acute due to consecutive droughts and resulted in major cut-downs in water allocation for 
irrigation. For the first time, farmers themselves realized that high-quality effluent that can be utilized 
for a wide range of crops is needed to provide a reliable alternative water resource to sustain 
agriculture. Thirdly, few health incidents related to wastewater pollution, raised public awareness thus 
pressure. In 1988 several poliomyelitis cases were discovered in the town of Or Akiva, causing public 
panic. Local municipalities in the area—neglecting to treat wastewater—were initially blamed, and 
while an investigation revealed at a later stage that this was not the cause—wastewater treatment 
already became a matter of public concern; pollution of water supply well as a result of leak from a 
sewage pipe resulted in 8,000 cases of dysentery in the metropolitan area of Haifa. Other less sever 
incidents also occurred. Fourthly, the collapse of the Soviet Block in 1989 opened the gates for Jews 
from the former USSR to immigrate to Israel. Over one million immigrants immigrated to a country of 
ca. five millions within few years, requiring housing and employment solutions. The Rabin 
Government, established in 1992, prioritized the infrastructure sectors, wastewater included, in order 
to accommodate the massive immigration. All these resulted in a paradigm shift regarding WWM as 
explained in the following.  
Property Rights  
Ownership: in this period a conflict between the Water Law and the Sewerage Law allowing 
municipalities to sell effluent became apparent. Since municipalities now invested in advanced 
WWTPs, many were interested in selling their high-quality effluent to their agricultural hinterland. 
Conflicts revolved around effluent price, as municipalities now demanded higher price per CM 
whereas the farmers, used to pay little or nothing, objected. Policy makers did not address these issues 
formally and adequately and in some cases, the Court was asked to intervene.  
Uses: previously acknowledged uses were more efficiently regulated, and new uses were 
recognized. The uses of ‘WWM for health aspect’ and ‘wastewater for agriculture use’ are further 
protected/restricted with the introduction of the 1992 regulations for effluent standards (base-line 
quality) and the 1995 regulations for protecting water wells - further restricting effluent irrigation, this 
time with focus on protection of water resources (Public Health Ordinance 1940). ‘Protection of fresh 
water resources’ is more effectively regulated with the amendment of the Water Law to include 
effective sanctions. ‘WWM for the protection of the environment’ is now acknowledged, both in terms 
of protecting the maritime environment via the 1988 Maritime Pollution Prevention from Land Based 
Sources Law (following the Barcelona Convention, introducing the influence of international 
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agreements) and in terms of rehabilitation of streams. The latter was acknowledged not via legislation 
but rather via the newly established Ministry of Environmental Protection’s (MINENV) general policy 
towards stream rehabilitation. As such, the Ministry regulates effluent discharge to streams to enable 
base-line flow when potable water is unavailable, by permits system and by requiring stricter effluent 
quality and other measures to insure suitable quality. The restriction of effluent discharge to streams 
was previously non-existent.  
Public Policy  
Problem perception and policy objectives: WWM was addressed for the first time from a more 
holistic approach. More uses/aspects (health, environment and irrigation) were acknowledged in 
combination and the interest of both health/environmental protection and irrigation were aligned, as 
farmers recognized the need for high-quality effluent. Both the MINHLT and the Water Commissioner 
co-initiated the effluent base-line regulations [23] and [27]. Furthermore, the treatment component 
received the main priority for the first time and the reuse component was addressed separately. The 
policy objective is, therefore, multiple-elements.  
Actors: New actors were introduced and the balance between previous actors, shifted. The most 
important new actor is the MINENV. Established in 1989 as a solution to a coalition crisis, it is the 
first independent organization with the sole interest of protecting the environment. It assumed the 
responsibility for protecting the water resources and soon became a crucial actor. The Ministry of 
Infrastructures, established in 1996, received the jurisdiction over the Water Commissioner and the 
Administration for the Development of Sewage Infrastructures (elaborated in the following). The 
Prime Minister’s office (during the Rabin’s government) was also an important actor, as the Prime 
Minister promoted improved WWM. The power-balance between the MINHLT and the MINAGR was 
shifting. Firstly, there was a drastic reduction of power of the MINAGR, due to combination of 
reasons. Agriculture lost its ideological status as well as its economic significance in the fast growing 
advanced market-economy (e.g., 17% of total employees in the agriculture sector in 1950 vs. 2.3% in 
2007) [28], and with the Water Commissioner being transferred to the Ministry of Infrastructures, the 
link between water management and the agricultural sector was broken for the first time. At the same 
time, the authority of the MINHLT increased due to the effluent base-line quality regulations. New 
attempt for coordination is the Sewage Administration. It had a similar task description as the previous 
Committee but with one representative from each Ministry, and in contrast to previous committees, 
was subordinated to the Ministry of Interior [21]. Nevertheless, power struggles and rivalries 
continued, especially between the MINHLT and MINENV over division of responsibilities. Non-
governmental actors became involved for the first time. NGOs became very influential actors although 
not formally by the regime but rather via the court and public awareness. Furthermore, new bodies 
related to WWM are introduced in this phase. Associations of Towns for the construction of regional 
WWTPs become common [15]; River Authorities are introduced starting 1989 and become involved in 
decisions regarding the destination and reuse of effluent, etc. Therefore, multiplication of number and 
type of actors involved but with little coordination.  
Levels of governance: decision-making became less centralized and the local level more involved 
within the general decentralization process as responsibilities for more services were transferred from 
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the central to the local government. The local level was equally represented in the Sewage 
Administration. Therefore, multiple-elements with better power distribution and coordination  
between levels; 
Strategy and instruments: Legislation includes new regulations/restrictions and amendments of 
existing legislation to better protect/restrict uses, as well as forceful enforcement. The 1992 base-line 
quality regulations, promulgated by the MINHLT, are considered a milestone of the paradigm shift. 
Introducing base-line standards, the regulations required municipalities to establish advanced WWTPs 
in order to comply, eliminating the common practice of low-tech solutions. They also provided the 
relevant authorities means for enforcement. Forceful enforcement is another crucial development and 
was one of the first actions taken by the MINENV. Firstly, the Water Law was amended to include 
substantial sanctions to polluters, including personal legal responsibility of Mayors/industrialists, 
imprisonment and high financial penalties. Secondly, Mayors/industrialists were being noticed 
regarding the requirement to adequately treat wastewater, and many were being indicted or threatened 
with indictment. Between 1994–1995 alone, 51 indictments were served [20]. Another mean of 
enforcement used by the Ministry, was refusal to populate newly-built housings. The massive 
immigration resulted in rapid development in many municipalities and had a major economical impact. 
Refusing to provide permissions put enormous pressure on Mayors. The Water Law was most recently 
amended in 2006. The MINHLT increased enforcement as well. Additional legislation/restrictions 
included restriction on wastewater discharge to the maritime environment via the 1988 Maritime 
Pollution Prevention Law; further restrictions on effluent with irrigation via the 1995 Public Health 
Ordinance (regulating conditions for drilling water wells), promulgated by the MINHLT and 
protecting wells from polluting activities including effluent irrigation; and stricter requirements for 
effluent quality if discharged to steams, by the MINENV. Concerning instruments, in addition to 
expanding the command-and-control instruments, market instruments were introduced. Grants were 
provided during 1993–1995 encouraging municipalities to apply for loans, and municipalities were 
encouraged (e.g., via grants) to privatize their water and wastewater services in order to improve their 
performance [29]. This was followed by the 2001 Water and Sewerage Corporations Law, encouraging 
municipalities to transform their administratively managed water sector to a more commercially 
oriented one. Therefore, multiple-elements instruments. 
Responsibilities and resources for implementation: with the introduction of new actors, the 
responsibilities were further divided because responsibilities under existing laws were transferred to 
the jurisdiction of the new ministries, thus the complexity increased with further fragmentation. 
However, with the reduction in the power of the MINAGR and the increasing involvement of the 
MINHLT and the municipalities, the power-distribution for implementation became more balanced. 
Concerning resources, the budgets for wastewater infrastructure were significantly increased [26]  
and [29] (from 15–20 million NIS a year prior to 1992, to 180 million NIS in 1993, 250 million in 
1994, 450 million in 1995 etc.). In combination with the availability of private capital—now being 
encouraged, financial resources were more available to the municipalities. Most municipalities had 
sufficient personnel resources or had access to such, via e.g., inter-municipal cooperation. The newly 
established MINENV, interestingly, began as a small ministry with little financial and personnel 
resources but managed in a short period of time to become the most important actor concerning the 
paradigm shift. Therefore, increased resources to the relevant actors.  
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Regime analysis  
The extent is characterized as high. Concerning PR system, more uses—including ecological, are 
recognized and all uses are better regulated. The internal coherence is low-medium due to the unsolved 
conflicts revolving effluent ownership and prices, and as coordination and mutual acknowledgment are 
still insufficient. The extent of the PP system also increases with the introduction of new policy 
objectives, actors, instruments, resources, etc. The system shifts to multiple-elements and becomes 
more complex. The internal coherence is characterized as low-medium as while there are attempts at 
coordination efforts and there seems to be better coordination within and between some of the 
elements (e.g., policy objectives, levels of governance), much improvement is still needed (e.g., 
including non-governmental actors in the policy network, reduced rivalries and improved cooperation). 
The external coherence can be characterized as medium as more uses are recognized as target groups 
by the policy system, although regulations need to be more effective and are yet to acknowledge all 
uses. The third phase is therefore defined as complex but fragmented with high extent and  
low-medium coherence.  
The Regime’s Results  
The beginning of the 1990s marked a shift in the Israeli WWM from use-driven to protection-driven 
policies, and advanced WWTPs were being constructed throughout the country. Indeed, in 2008, ca. 
92% of wastewater was treated, with 55% of generated wastewater treated to secondary treatment and 
additional 32% treated to tertiary level [30] and [1]. Although the issue is far from being solved, with 
the remaining being insufficiently treated (mostly primary treatment) or untreated [30]—this is, no 
doubt, a substantial improvement in comparison to previous phases. Several factors can explain the 
shift (Section 4) but the new trend can be clearly attributed to the central government/authorities. If in 
previous phases, the centralized decision-making style combined with problem perception that 
‘nationalized’ the effluent dictated low-tech solutions releasing municipalities of their obligation, in 
this phase, a combination of more balanced problem perception and power distribution, a shift to 
decentralized decision-making approach, increased enforcement and availability of resources, restored 
the authority of the municipalities and made it impossible for them to continue neglecting the matter. 
The three phases of the WWM evolution are summarized in Table 1.  
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Table 1. WWM regime evolution in Israel. 
Regime phases  Description Results  
Phase one—simple 
regime  
(1948–1970) 
WWM is dominated by one main user/actor: 
agriculture, with focus on use-driven policies. Public 
policy system is mainly single-element and is 
characterized by a single problem perspective: 
wastewater as a water resource, centralized decision 
making style, lack of enforcement and insufficient 
resources. Insufficient coordination among and 
between the different elements of the regime.  
Low-tech, low-cost wastewater 
treatment solutions; continuous 
discharge of untreated or 
partially treated wastewater to 
the environment and pollution 
of water resources. 
Phase two—Simple 
to complex: failed 
regime shift  
(1970–end of 
1980s) 
Following the cholera outbreak more uses are formally 
restricted/protected and the public policy system 
slightly expands with the appearance of new 
instruments (new legislation) and resources (separate 
budgets). In practice, however, the momentum is 
missed and soon after thing go back to ‘business as 
usual’ and the dominancy of one use: wastewater for 
agricultural use, prevails. Sanitary and environmental 
uses are further neglected. 
Mainly unchanged. The 
centralized decision-making 
style combined with problem 
perception that ‘nationalized’ 
the effluent dictated certain 
solutions releasing 
municipalities of their 
obligation and resulting in 
continuous pollution. 
Phase three—
complex but 
fragmented (end of 
1980s/beginning of 
1990s <) 
 
As a response to non-related pressures from different 
fields/levels, more uses are acknowledged and better 
regulated by the regime and the public policy system 
shifts to a multiple-element system with a more 
balanced problem perception and power distribution, a 
shift to decentralized decision-making approach, 
increased enforcement and availability of resources. A 
shift to protection-driven policies, is observed. While 
the regime becomes complex, coordination among and 
between the different elements remains insufficient, 
therefore: fragmentation. 
Advanced WWTPs are being 
constructed throughout the 
country; the authority of the 
municipalities is restored and it 
became very difficult for them 
to continue neglecting WWM. 
4. Transitions in the Evolution Process 
Why did the first transition attempt, following the cholera outbreak, fail while the second resulted in 
the paradigm shift? Triggers and conditions of both are analyzed in the following.  
4.1. Failed Transition (1970) 
The trigger for the 1970 transition attempt is the cholera outbreak, via economical consequences 
and public outcry. This problem-related trigger forced policy makers to address the issue of WWM 
from a broader perspective. However, this had a short-term effect as once the outbreak was under 
control, all was forgotten by both the public and the Government and practices that were required by 
the World Bank were adopted formally but hardly implemented. The resources were affected, but not 
the motives. From the transition theory perspective, the cholera is a pressure from the micro-level. 
This, however, was not accompanied by parallel pressures/triggers, nor were there pressures from the  
macro-level. Furthermore, changes did not occur under the surface in the pre-development stage, 
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therefore while the cholera was a powerful trigger, it was not sown on a fertile ground. Finally, 
different perspectives from different fields did not converge into one to allow the take-of stage. 
Instead, the main actors chose to be fixed on the existing paradigm, prolonging the conflict between 
the health and agricultural uses and the dominancy of one over the other. This can explain why the 
regime  
(meso-level) did not change. The transition theory can therefore explain the failure of the trigger to set 
a transition in motion, as the right conditions for both multi-level and multi-stage concepts are  
not found.  
4.2. Successful Transition (End of 1980s–Beginning of 1990s)  
Several triggers set in motion this successful transition. Directly related are: problem-related 
triggers (sporadic health hazards; increasing degradation of all streams and groundwater quality; water 
scarcity crisis; rise of the environmental movement) and institutional triggers (the establishment of the 
MINENV and the reduced power of the MINAGR). Indirectly related are: demographic developments 
(massive immigration from former USSR); the general policy process in related fields (the Rabin’s 
Government policy of upgrading infrastructures) and global developments/events (the collapse of the 
USSR, the drop in world cotton prices).  
These triggers explain well the successful transition if analyzed within the conceptual framework of 
the transition theory, as pressures from different fields and levels co-aligned to cause the regime to 
change. On the macro-level pressures include the collapse of the USSR, the drop in world cotton 
prices, and consecutive droughts. On the micro-level pressures include sporadic health hazards; 
increasing degradation of fresh water resources; water scarcity crisis; and the rise of the environmental 
movement. The institutional triggers (e.g., MINENV) can be described as inner trigger from the meso-
level. Combined with the multi-stage concept, the transition can be explained as the following: in the  
pre-development stage changes such as growing public awareness, recognition of the agricultural 
sector for the need of reliable alternative water resource to sustain agriculture, etc., start to occur under 
the surface so when pressures occurred, the relevant actors were prone to respond. The pressures - both 
from macro and micro level, co-aligned and reinforced each other, resulting in different perceptions to 
come together to a shared paradigm, and the take-off stage was reached. For example, only when both 
the MINAGR and MINHLT identified a mutual interest, the base-line effluent quality regulations were 
promulgated. In the acceleration stage, the policy system was altered and the regime enabled the shift 
by allocation of sufficient budget, forceful enforcement etc. Finally, the dominant practices indeed 
change rapidly and irreversibly. This explains well the conditions that resulted in the 1990s’  
paradigm shift. 
5. Conclusions 
In the State of Israel, wastewater treatment—formally the responsibility of local authorities—was 
neglected for decades, leading to environmental pollution and degradation of the scarce water 
resources. This trend was reversed during the 1990s and although to date the situation is far from being 
resolved, there is a substantial improvement in comparison to previous decades in terms of treated 
wastewater and its disposal. The paper analyses the Israeli WWM regime from the central government 
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perspective and reveals that the central government’s policies and agendas highly influenced WWM at 
the municipal level, explaining both the long-term neglect and the paradigm shift. Since WWM is the 
responsibility of local authorities in many countries and as pollution by wastewater is a major 
remaining issue in many regions, the Israeli case may be of interest to them as well.  
The Israeli WWM regime evolution shows three phases: simple; simple→complex (failed regime 
change); and complex but fragmented. The observed shift is from single user with focus on WWM for 
agricultural use (low-extent), and related single/few public governance elements, to a more complex 
regime that acknowledges additional users and is characterized by multiple public policy elements 
(increased extent and complexity). The analysis reveals that the long-term neglect can be mainly 
attributed to the dominancy of one user, thus actor, over the others, a dominancy that was derived from 
the status of agriculture in the new State. Receiving jurisdiction over water management while being 
the largest water user, the MINAGR managed wastewater as part of the national water resources, 
according to its use-driven policies. Furthermore, in the young State, water as public property was 
managed by a very centralized approach. The centralized decision-making style combined with the 
over-powering agricultural use, led to solutions that were dictated based on the agricultural interest but 
were far from protecting the rights of other uses. This resulted in almost non-existent authority of 
municipalities concerning this matter. Even a cholera outbreak did not fundamentally change this, and 
policy-makers continued with ‘business-as-usual’ approach resulting in massive degradation of the 
water resources and the environment. The Water Commissioner, being subordinated to the MINAGR, 
failed to protect the water resources by failing to restrict utilization of low-quality effluent for 
irrigation. The paradigm shift can also be attributed to the central government rather than to the 
municipalities and was enabled once more uses were recognized by the policy system and by a shift to 
multi-elements public policy system. A shift to a more decentralized decision making style, 
amendment of legislation, forceful enforcement, and allocation of adequate resources resulted in 
municipalities regaining their authority and taking action. The Israeli case reveals that although WWM 
is formally a municipal obligation, actions taken within the central policy system highly influenced 
WWM at the municipal level.  
To explain the paradigm shift, the transition phases are analyzed. In the Israeli WWM evolution two 
transitions are identified: the first failed—resulting in unchanged circumstances, but the second 
succeeded, leading to the paradigm shift. Building on the IRR approach, the paper applies also the 
transition theory to analyze the transitions and the latter explains well both the failed and successful 
transitions. In the failed transition conditions were not fully met: there were no developments under the 
surface in the pre-cholera phase and while the cholera was a powerful trigger, it was not accompanied 
by parallel pressures, nor did it result in different interests converging into a shared paradigm. The 
regime, geared towards preserving the status quo, was not affected and continued managing 
wastewater in a similar manner once the pressure was eased. The successful transition, on the other 
hand, demonstrates well favorable conditions and explains the shift. Triggers from different 
levels/fields co-aligned to pressure the regime to change, and different perspectives converged to a 
similar paradigm for the first time. Changing the status quo became possible only when it was in the 
interest of all relevant actors (responding to pressures from different levels and fields), resulting in a 
broader and more holistic problem perception. Once the different interests aligned, alteration in other 
property rights and public policy elements followed, mainly recognizing more users and restricting 
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some to protect the others (restricting WWM for agricultural use to protect health, water resources and 
the environment), as well as providing the relevant instruments (amendment and enforcement of 
legislation) and sufficient resources for implementation.  
Several lessons can be learnt: (i) Responsibilities for water resources management (including 
wastewater) should be awarded to an actor with no direct interest as a water user (e.g., the Ministry of 
Infrastructure, the MINENV). In the Israeli case subordinating water management to the MINAGR—
the largest water user with a direct interest in wastewater as a water resource, explains well the long 
term-neglect of wastewater treatment. Once the responsibilities for protecting the water resources were 
transferred from MINAGR to the newly established MINENV sanctions under the Water Law were 
being used for the first time with crucial impact on WWM; (ii) Establishing an authority responsible 
solely for protecting the environment. In the Israeli case establishing the MINENV had a substantial 
effect on WWM as prior to that all other actors involved (e.g., MINHLT, MINAGR, Ministry of 
Interior) had other more primary interests to serve, neglecting protection of the environment and the 
water resources; (iii) Responsible authorities can and should use the authority given to them even if 
they are relatively weak and small. In the Israeli case the MINENV started as a small Ministry, 
established only to solve a coalition crisis, and had very limited resources available to it. Receiving 
authority that previously belonged to other Ministries, it could have continued along the same line of 
in-action and remain a marginal actor, but position holders (mainly the first Director General) were 
determined to make a change; (iv) When WWM is formally decentralized, as is the case in many 
countries, local authorities should be given the means/tools to carry out their obligation, whereas the 
central authorities should retain only monitoring and facilitating roles. In the Israeli case there was a 
mismatch between the two: local authorities were formally responsible but wastewater was managed 
de facto as a national water resource by a very centralized approach. This released municipalities of 
their obligation and explains well the long-term neglect. Once central authorities reversed this 
approach, demanded action by the municipalities on one hand and provided them with the relevant 
instruments on the other, municipalities responded accordingly.  
Concerning future developments in the Israeli WWM evolution, despite the noted improvements, 
WWM is far from being satisfactory with ca. 15% of generated wastewater being insufficiently treated 
or untreated in 2008, continuing to pollute the environment. In addition, along-side the increase in 
complexity the system remained fragmented with inadequate cooperation. In the context of the IRR 
theory the transition to an integrated more sustainable regime is yet to occur. Such integration can be 
expected to promote better cooperation among the various actors to result in a shared and integrated 
problem perspective and thus coordination of strategies, instruments, and responsibilities/authorities, 
and can be seen as the way forward towards solutions to the remaining problems. Since this shift is not 
expected to be spontaneous, it requires a deliberate effort. Policy-makers need to take action towards 
better acknowledgment and involvement of all relevant actors, including non-governmental actors and 
the public in the policy system, as well promote better and more meaningful cooperation among them. 
Based on the poor results of previous coordination attempts, the results of such steps—if and when 
taken, are yet to be seen.  
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